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A ROLE FOR STATE COURT ADJUDICATIONS IN
FEDERAL TAX CASES - A PROPOSAL
Leon C. Misterek*
INTRODUCTION
The role of state law in the federal system of taxation is obviously
an important one. The Internal Revenue Code is phrased largely in
terms of state law concepts.' More important than the terminology of
the Internal Revenue Code, however, is the fact that the incidence of
the federal tax is upon rights and duties of economic consequence that
are, for the most part,2 created and defined by state law.3
In adjudicating federal tax liability, the federal tribunal is likely to
treat state law as if it were simply another fact in the case. If tax liability
is deemed to turn upon state law," the salient principle is searched out
from among the statutes and precedents of the appropriate jurisdiction.
The prevailing principle of state law, once determined, is applied to
facts of the case and upon the results of this application taxability vel
non is made to depend.
This description of the tax case decision-making process is greatly
simplified. Indeed, it is deceptively simple. In addition to its other
deficiencies, 5 this description of the process fails to contemplate that the
taxpayer may bring to the tax proceeding a state court judgment or
decree involving himself and based upon some of the very facts to be
* Member, Washington Bar.
1. An obvious example is provided by INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 61, which
defines gross income to include "interest," ". rents," "royalties" and "dividends.'" Obvious
exceptions are "collapsible corporation," INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341 (-a)(1) and
"income in respect of a decedent," INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 691 (a) (1).
'2. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 61(a), includes as gross income "all income
from whatever source derived ... ." Thus income received by virtue of federal laws or
the laws of foreign countries is also subject to the tax.
3. However, "the federal government can remold the types of kettles before
it puts its long handled spoon in them." United States v. Loo, 248 F.2d 765, 767 (9th
Cir. 1957).
4. Such liability may be imposed by "express language or necessary implication."
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
5. It fails to acknowledge the difficulty in determining when the federal taxing
act is by necessary implication dependent upon state law. It fails too, to indicate that
cases may arise in which the pertinent principle of state law is unclear.
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considered by the federal tribunal.6
Before the Supreme Court's decision in C.I.R. v. Estate of Bosch
and Second National Bank of New Haven v. United States,7 the rule
that obtained could be simply stated. The state court adjudication would
conclusively determine the federal tax issue and would be strictly binding
upon the Commissioner and the federal tribunal. This rule would apply
if purported to be a decision of issues regularly submitted to the state
court; and if it was not collusively obtained by the taxpayer for the
purpose of affecting the Government's right to additional tax.'
With the Court's decision in Bosch, the rule has become a more
restrictive one, at least in cases involving the marital deduction. In cases
of that kind, the decision of a state trial court as to an underlying issue
of state law is not controlling in the federal tax litigation.
The purpose of this article is to examine, critically, the approach
that federal courts have followed in dealing with state court judgments
in federal tax cases. It is submitted that the rules, expressed in the
terminology as stated above, have been subject to uncritical application
with unsound decisions as a result. Likewise, it is suggested that the
rules' phraseology and potential for misapplication are the cause of much
needless litigation in both the federal and the state courts. This article
will suggest an alternate manner of viewing state adjudications and the
role that they ought to play in federal tax cases: the role of state judg-
ments should be limited to that of conclusive evidence of rights and duties
as of the time of their entry and presumptive evidence of the factual and
legal determinations upon which they are based.
PREVAILING CASE LAW BEFORE BoscH
Freuler v. Helvering
The Supreme Court first treated a state court judgment as con-
clusive in a federal tax case in 1934, Freuler v. Helvering, in which
a decree of a California court had become a part of the case. A California
testator had established a testamentary trust, creating life interests in
income with remainders over in fee. The trustee had invested trust
assets in depreciable property and paid all of the income to the income
beneficiaries without making any deduction for depreciation. In reporting
6. Or, it may be the Commissioner who brings the state court action. See, e.g.,
Harry F. Shannon, 29 T.C. 702 (1958) (taxpayer was denied a deduction for her share
of a partnership net operating loss because a state court had held that as a married
woman she was without capacity to become a partner and was instead a creditor).
7. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
8. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
9. Id.
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their income from the trust, the income beneficiaries had deducted that
part of the income resulting from depreciation of the trust assets.
The Commissioner, taking the position that the income attributable
to depreciation was distributable trust income, had proposed to tax it as
income to the income beneficiaries and had determined a deficiency in
their tax. The will creating the trust made no mention of the manner in
which the trustee should treat depreciation. No California statute or
appellate decision provided guidance as to whether the income benefici-
aries or the remaindermen should bear the depreciation of trust assets.
The Commissioner contended that in the absence of such a provision
in the will or the California statutes and case law, the general law of
trusts should obtain; the remaindermen should bear the depredation of
trust assets, and the income representing depreciation was distributable
to the income beneficiaries and taxable to them under section 219(d)
of the Revenue Act of 1921.1"
While the case was pending before the Board of Tax Appeals, the
trustee filed his first account in a California court having jurisdiction
over the trust. Objection to the account, particularly to the trustee's
payment of income to the income beneficiaries without deduction for
depreciation, was made by the remaindermen. The California court
sustained the objection and decreed that the income beneficiaries repay
the amounts representing depreciation received theretofore to the trustee.
The Supreme Court held that the California court's decree was
binding upon the Commissioner; and that it conclusively established
that proceeds from the depreciation of trust assets were not distributable
income for the purpose of section 219 of the Revenue Act of 1921.11
The real significance of the Court's holding is not clear. To be sure,
it was dispositive of the case at hand, but it provided little in the way of
guidance for the future. At one point the Court stated, "[W]hat the law
as announced by that California court adjudges distributable is, we think,
to be so considered in applying § 219 of the Act of 192 1.' '12
The Court may have meant nothing more than this: in its decree
the California court has announced the law of California as it relates to
who shall bear the burden of depreciation of trust assets; its statement of
the California law is conclusive, and since there is no dispute about the
facts of the case, we concur in the conclusion that the depreciation
proceeds were not properly distributable to the income beneficiaries.
This interpretation of the Court's holding finds some support in
the Court's statement that:
10. Now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 652 (a).
11. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934).
12. Id.
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[T]he decision of that California court, until reversed or
overruled, establishes the law of California respecting distribu-
tion of the trust estate. It is none the less a declaration of the
law of the State because not based on a statute or earlier de-
cisions. .... "
At another point the Court stated, "[T]he decree was a judgment
which fixed the rights of the remaindermen and the obligations of the life
tenants .. .""1 This statement suggests that the Court's rationale in
according conclusiveness to the California court's decree was that the
parties' rights and obligations upon which the tax is predicated were
conclusively determined by the decree; that the rights and obligations
could not be other than as set out in the decree; and that the Commis-
sioner should not be permitted 5 to proceed upon the assumption that
the parties' rights and obligations could be different from those recited
in the decree.
Finally, the Court in Freuler stated that the California court's
decree was conclusive "as to what was in fact and in law income
distributable to the beneficiaries under the trust."' 6  This language
would indicate that the Court considered the California court's findings
of fact as well as its announcement of the California law binding upon it.
Blair v. Commissioner
The Freuler case was cited as authority in Blair v. Commissioner,7
a case presenting similar issues. The issues in Blair as they related to
local law were whether the trust of which the taxpayer was an income
beneficiary was a spendthrift trust. If it was a spendthrift trust, the
taxpayer's attempted assignments of a part of his interest in it con-
stituted assignments of income which remained taxable to the tax-
payer.' 8 If the trust was not a spendthrift trust, the assignments were
of equitable interests in the trust corpus, and the taxpayer was not
taxable on the income received by the assignees.
The trustees of the trust involved in Blair had the will creating the
trust construed by the appropriate Illinois court. That court, pursuant
to a mandate from an Illinois intermediate appellate court, had decreed
that the trust was not a spendthrift trust under the laws of the State of
13. Id.
14. 291 U.S. at 46.
15. Perhaps as a matter of logic or perhaps as a matter of due process. Cf.
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 678 (1933), and Mr. Justice Sutherland's dissenting
opinion therein at 683-85.
16. 291 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
17. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
18. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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Illinois and that the taxpayer's assignments of his interest in it were
valid.
As it had done in Freuler, the Court in Blair held the decree of the
Illinois court to be conclusively determinative of the nature of the trust.
The Court did little in Blair to clarify or limit the basis of its rationale
in Freuler. It added simply:
[T]o derogate from the authority of that conclusion of the
Illinois appellate court and of the decree it commanded, so far
as the question is one of state law, would be wholly unwar-
ranted in the exercise of federal jurisdiction."9
This statement indicates that comity may have been one of the reasons
for according conclusiveness to the state court's decree. But it fails to
indicate what aspect or aspects of the decree shall be accorded conclusive
effect.
After its decision in Blair, the Supreme Court did not again seri-
ously consider the treatment of state court adjudications until its decision
in Bosch.2" From 1937 until 1967, then, the law in the area was shaped
by the lower federal courts. These courts followed the rule announced in
Freuler and Blair and gave state court adjudications conclusive weight
unless collusively obtained by the taxpayer.
But in the myriad of lower court cases21 which have followed
Blair, we have found no clear articulation of what it is to which the
courts may accord conclusiveness: whether to the state court's determina-
tions of fact; to its announcement of state court law; to its adjudication
of relationships between parties to the state court proceeding; or to a
combination of all or less than all of these. However, the courts, for the
most part, appear to accord conclusiveness to state court "judgments"
and "decrees" and, possibly, to all that those terms may conceivably
encompass.
THE BOSCH CASE
Both C.I.R. v. Estate of Bosch and Second National Bank of New
Haven v. United States22 involved the estate tax marital deduction.2"
19. 300 U.S. at 10.
20. The problem was raised, but not seriously considered by the Court, in
Sharp v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 624 (1937) (mem. dec.) ; and Helvering v. Ballard,
303 U.S. 297 (1937). See Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in
a Subsequent Federal Income Tax Case, 12 TAX L. REv. 213, 214 (1957).
21. For a good bibliography of lower court cases involving state court judg-
ments in federal tax cases, see Berger, Tax Consequences of Non-Tax Proceedings,
17 INST. ON FED. TAX. 87, 105n. 77 (N.Y.U. 1959).
22. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
23. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(a).
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In the former case, a state court adjudication would, if given effect,
have granted a marital deduction which the Commissioner was unwilling
to allow. In the latter case a state court adjudication would have resulted
in a larger deduction than the Commissioner was willing to allow. In
its opinion disposing of both cases the Supreme Court held that the
federal taxing authority was not bound by the state trial courts' de-
terminations of property interests.
The Impact of Bosch
The scope of Bosch's impact upon the rule of Freuler v. Helvering
is not altogether clear at this time. Surely state trial court adjudications
no longer conclusively determine federal tax issues involving the marital
deductions, even in the absence of collusion. But whether they will con-
tinue conclusively to determine other federal tax issues remains to be
seen.
Arguably, the restriction in Bosch upon Freuler and Blair is only
applicable to state adjudications which affect the marital deduction. In
its majority opinion, the Court in Bosch did not expressly overrule its
decisions in either Freuler or Blair,24 neither of which involved the
marital deduction. Further, in concluding that the federal courts were
free to disregard the trial courts' determinations of property interests,
the Court relied heavily upon Congress' expressed intent that the marital
deduction should be strictly construed25 and that " 'proper regard'
not finality, 'should be given to interpretations of the will' by state
courts and then only when entered by a court 'in a bona fide adversary
proceeding.' "2
Without regard to the exact scope of its impact upon Freuler and
Blair, however, Bosch appears to teach that in some cases state court
adjudications may be disregarded.
Under Freuler and Blair and the lower court cases which have
followed in their wake, state adjudications may conclusively determine
the federal tax issue. And in cases controlled by Bosch they may be
disregarded altogether. It is this all or nothing approach to which we
object and for which we propose an alternate approach.
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
An Alternate Approach
Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking in dissent in Freuler v. Helvering"
24. The Court did, however, distinguish Blair on the ground that it had involved
the decision of an intermediate appellate court.
25. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948).
26. 387 U.S. at 464.
27. 291 U.S. 35, 47 (1934).
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suggested the manner in which state court adjudications ought to be
regarded in federal tax proceedings: "The order is no more than
evidence of pre-existing rights and duties."28 From the context in which
his statement is made, the word "pre-existing" appears to refer to the
respective rights and duties of the parties as they had existed after the
state court's order had been entered, but before its import had been
modified by an agreement. From his dissenting opinion it appears, also,
that Mr. Justice Cardozo was willing to regard the order as conclusive
evidence of the parties' rights and duties.29 Thus, without doing violence
to its contextual setting, the statement might be paraphrased to read:
The order is no more than conclusive evidence of rights and duties as
they existed at the time of its entry.
This, we submit, is the proper function of a state court judgment or
decree in a federal tax case. When treated as something more they
assume an exaggerated importance; their importance qua judgments
and decrees becomes greater than the sum of their constituent parts.
The ease with which the apparent tax problem may be solved through
their application may obscure, to litigants and to courts alike, the real
nature of the tax problem. What might more aptly be treated as but one
piece of evidence in the case assumes what might be called the aura of
judgment.
Inadequacies of the Present Decision-Making Process
Conclusiveness of State Court Adjudications
Mr. Justice Cardozo, in his dissent in Freuler v. Helvering,"
advanced an opinion that the majority of the Court had been led into
error by the presence of the California court's order in the case. The
California court had ordered the income beneficiaries to return the
depreciation theretofore received to the trustee, so that it could be added
to the trust corpus and ultimately distributed to the remaindermen.
Following the entry of the California court's order, the income bene-
ficiaries, with the consent of the presumptive remaindermen, had dis-
charged their obligations under the order by giving the trustee their
non-interest bearing notes, payable upon termination of the trust.
Under this state of the facts, opined Justice Cardozo, although the
income beneficiaries did not receive the full amount of trust income
representing depreciaton, they did receive the value of its full and
uninhibited use and enjoyment between the dates of receipt and ter-
28. Id. at 50.
29. Id. at 49; see Colowick supra note 20 at 215 n.8.
30. 291 U.S. at 47.
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mination of the trust."' And that value has become distributable income
by agreement of the parties. Although the California court's order did
conclusively determine, at the time of its entry, the rights of the parties,
its effect was undone by the subsequent agreement.
We shall not presume to pass upon the correctness of the result
reached by the majority in Freuler v. Helvering. It does appear, however,
that in its preoccupation with the California court's order, the majority
failed to consider fully whether the value of the use and enjoyment of
depreciation proceeds had become income distributable to the income
beneficiaries. The fact of the subsequent agreement and its possible
significance were raised and argued by the Commissioner and con-
sidered by the Court."2 But the Court's consideration of the subsequent
agreement, so far as the opinion discloses, was limited to whether it
impugned the integrity, and consequently the conclusive effect, of the
California court's order.3 Having concluded that it did not, the Court
failed to go on and consider whether the value of use and enjoyment of
depreciation proceeds had become distributable income by agreement.
The Commissioner was precluded by the state court's order.
Freuler v. Helvering illustrates a potential danger. If state judg-
ments are not treated as evidence, albeit conclusive evidence, of rights
and duties as of the time of their entry, but rather are accorded some
greater and undefined significance, the aura of judgment may well lead
litigants or courts, or both, to overlook some important post judgment
fact.
Another potential danger-that presented by semantic similarity-
is illustrated by Estate of Chism,3 4 which concerned a controversy over
the nature of withdrawals made by a majority stockholder from a
closely held corporation. The taxpayer contended that they were loans
and so were not taxable as income, while the Commissioner contended
that they were taxable as dividends. A Nevada probate court had agreed
with the taxpayer.
During the later years of his life, E. W. Chism, a majority share-
holder in a Nevada corporation, had made substantial cash withdrawals
from the corporation. Following his death, the corporation submitted a
creditor's claim, in the amount of the withdrawals, to his estate. The
claim was allowed as an enforceable claim against the estate and ordered
paid.
31. Id. at 51-52.
32. Id. at 45-46.
33. Id. at 46-47.
34. T. C. Mem. 1962-6, 21 C.C.H. TAX CT. MEM. 25 (1962).
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In the Tax Court proceeding that followed,8" the taxpayer took
the position that allowance of the corporation's claim by the Nevada
probate court conclusively characterized the withdrawals as loans for
federal income tax purposes. The Commissioner disagreed, asserting
that the probate adjudication was collusively obtained, or was at best
non-adversary, and was not conclusive of the federal tax question.
Issue was joined over the nature of the probate proceeding. The
Tax Court held that the probate adjudication was not binding upon it,8"
either because of the non-adversary nature of the proceeding, or perhaps
because it considered the proceeding collusive. On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit,87 the same arguments were presented. The Commissioner argued
that only adjudications in adversary proceedings may be conclusive,
and also that the adjudication in issue had been obtained solely for the
purpose of affecting federal tax liability. The taxpayer urged that in
order to be conclusive the adjudication need not be the result of a pro-
ceeding in which one party has said "yes" and another has said "no,"
and that the adjudication had not been obtained solely for the purpose
of affecting federal tax liability."
Upon allowance of the claim, the estate was obligated to repay the
amount of the withdrawals to the corporation. But whether the with-
drawals were taxable as dividends was also dependent upon whether
the parties to the "loans" intended to enforce and discharge that obliga-
tion."0 Certainly the Nevada probate court had not purported to pass
upon the parties' intent in this regard. There is no reason to believe
that, in determining that the withdrawals were loans rather than dividends,
the Nevada court had applied this peculiar criterion to the federal tax law.
Yet it appears that both parties to the Tax Court proceeding as-
sumed that the adjudication in probate court could be conclusively
dispositive of the tax issue.4' And the Tax Court, while it reappraised
the evidence relating to the withdrawals "in the light of a standard
peculiar to federal tax law," 2 appears to have proceeded upon the
assumption that the allowance of the claim would have been conclusive
upon it if it had been the result of a bona fide adversary proceeding. 8
35. Id.
36. Id. at 32.
37. Chism's Estate v. C.I.R., 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963).
38. Id. at 959.
39. Id.
40. Clark v. C.I.R., 266 F.2d 698, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1959); Wiese v. C.I.R., 93
F.2d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562 (1938).
41. 322 F.2d at 959.
42. Id. at 960.
43. See Chism's Estate v. C.I.R., 322 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Chism's
Estate, TAX CT. MEM. 1962-6, C.C.H. TAX CT. MEM. 25, 32 (1962).
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In the absence of a state court judgment, it is likely that neither the
Tax Court nor the Commissioner would have considered the fact of legal
obligation to repay as dispositive of the case. But when cloaked with a
state court adjudication, the obligation assumed a new importance. It
would, if the result of a bona fide adversary proceeding, have been
conclusively dispositive of the case.
The Collusion Issue
Code,"' regulations,45  and cases" alike, indicate that a term's
meaning as used for federal tax purposes will not necessarily coincide
with that of its counterpart in the local law. At least one court"
and one textwriter" have indicated the futility of litigating the issue of
whether a state adjudication has been obtained collusively in cases in
which tax liability has not been made to depend wholly on state law. 9
Federal courts have declined to accord conclusiveness to state adjudica-
tions in cases in which the state courts rendering them have not con-
sidered an issue peculiar to the tax controversy."
But so long as the exact role of state court adjudications goes
undefined, and so long as they are regarded as something more than
conclusive evidence of rights and duties, the precise limits of the under-
lying tax problem are likely to be obscured. Taxpayers are likely to
continue their efforts to strengthen weak tax cases by dignifying them
with state court adjudications." Litigants are also likely to continue to
address their arguments to the nature of state adjudications which are
not relevant or are not dispositive, as was done in Chism. Thus, the
potential for erroneous results is likely to continue.
44. E.g., the very detailed definition of "general power of appointment" con-
tained in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041(b), indicates that that term's definition is
not to be derived wholly from state law concepts.
45. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c), "Effect of local law," which states that
"the clause into which organizations are to 'be placed for purposes of taxation are
determined under the Internal Revenue Code."
46. E.g., Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940) ; and see the cases listed
in 10 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 61.02 n.7 (Zimet Rev. 1964).
47. Gallagher v. Smith, 233 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 1955).
48. I PAUL, FED. ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION, § 1.11 at 75-77 (1942).
49. Chism's Estate v. C.I.R., 322 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1963).
50. E.g., Earle v. C.I.R., 157 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Estate of Hagenlocher,
42 T.C. No. 80 (1964).
51. See, e.g., Darlington's Estate, 36 T.C. 599 (1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 693 (3d
Cir. 1962); Sweet's Estate, 24 T.C. 488 (1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956)
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Leslie H. Green, 7 T.C. 263 (1946), aff'd
per curian, 168 F.2d 994 (6th Cir. 1948) [in which the taxpayers began state court
proceedings only after tax deficiency proceedings had been initiated]. See also Berger,
Tax Consequences of Non-Tax Proceedings, 17 INST. ON FED. TAX. 87, 102-14 (N.Y.U.
1959), which outlines points of strategy to be employed in obtaining the state judgment
so that it will best serve the tax needs.
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Heretofore, it has been suggested that state judgments be regarded
as conclusive evidence of rights and duties only as they existed at the
time of entry.5 2  It has also been suggested that events may occur
subsequent to entry which will change the nature of the relationship of
which the judgment is evidence."
Similarly, the judgment may not accurately reflect the legal relation-
ships of the parties to it as they existed prior to the time of its entry.
The judgment, entered either through collusion or without active op-
position, may establish relationships entirely out of keeping with the
actual state of affairs as they existed prior to entry.
In both Freuler v. Helvering,54 and Blair v. Commissioner,"
the Supreme Court has indicated that state court judgments that have
been collusively or fraudulently obtained are not entitled to be regarded
as conclusive.56 The Court did not consider the state judgments in
either case to have been collusively obtained, and its statements in those
cases concerning collusion are brief and obscure. The fact of their
ambiguity has been stated and their possible meaning explored else-
where5" and will not be treated here.
Essentially, the lower courts have divided on what constitutes
fraud or collusion of a nature that will undermine the conclusiveness of
a state court adjudication. Some circuit courts and the Tax Court
have adopted the rule that an adjudication is collusive and the resulting
judgment is not conclusive if there is no adversity of parties in the state
court proceeding." The Third Circuit has taken the position that a
state judgment is conclusive unless obtained for the purpose of defeating
the tax.5 Between these poles the circuit courts have assumed positions
which one writer has cataloged into a spectrum ranging from "strict"
to "easy. '
The proper classification of state judgments as collusive or not
52. See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
53. Id.
54. 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
55. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
56. The Court was not confronted with a judgment that it considered to have
been collusively or fraudulently obtained in either case. Consequently, the Court has not
definitively held that collusively or fraudulently procured judgments are not to be
accorded conclusive effect.
57. Sachs, The Binding Effect of Nontax Litigation in State Courts, 21 INsT.
ON FED. TAX. 277, 279-81 (N.Y.U. 1963); Berger, supra note 51, at 103-05; Colowick,
The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in a Subsequent Federal Income
Tax Case, 12 TAX. L. REv. 213, 214-18 (1957).
58. E.g., Third National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 228 F.2d 772
(1st Cir. 1956) ; Stevens' Estate, 36 T.C. 184 (1961).
59. Darlington's Estate v. C.I.R., 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962); Babcock's Estate
v. C.I.R., 234 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
60. Berger, supra note 51, at 106.
Misterek: A Role for State Court Adjudications in Federal Tax Cases–A Propo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1968
12 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
collusive has assumed a large measure of importance. A perusal of the
lower court tax cases involving state judgments will reveal that in many
cases the bulk of the effort of both litigants and courts has been directed
to the resolution of this issue."'
The importance which is currently attached to this classification is
attributable to the magnitude of the consequences which follow. It is an
"all or nothing" proposition. If the judgment is determined to have
been collusively obtained, its subject will be relitigated in the federal
forum, normally to the chagrin of the taxpayer and the gratification of
the Commissioner." If the judgment is deemed to have been obtained
bona fide, or with the requisite degree of adversity, or both, it will be
conclusive of the entire matter, with appropriate differences in the
attitudes of the parties litigant.
A Critical Appraisal of the Rationale of Current Rules
As indicated above, if the state judgment passes the litmus test,
conclusiveness attaches. It attaches not only to the rights and duties
which the judgment reflects, but also, apparently, to all of the legal and
factual bases upon which it is purported to be predicated.
The reasons behind this phenomenon are not easy to isolate. For
federal tax purposes a non-appellate state court's interpretation of state
law is not binding per se upon the federal forum ;6" it i's binding only if
merged into a conclusive judgment. 4 Also, absent the applicability of
res adjudicata or collateral estoppel, a state court's adjudication of an
issue of fact only collaterally germane to the tax issue would surely
not be binding upon the federal forum. Yet, when made in support of a
judgment determined to be conclusive, determinations of fact and pro-
nouncements of law become conclusive.
The reason most often given is that the state judgment con-
clusively fixes the rights and liabilities of the parties.65 As indicated in
Darlington's Estate v. C.I.R., 6 if anybody changes his mind he will
have a hard time trying to avoid the state court decree.
61. See cases cited in Berger, supra note 51, n.77.
62. "[S]ometimes the shoe is on the other foot, and the taxpayer considers
that he will benefit by the application of a federal, as distinguished from a local, rule
of property." 10 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 61.01 (Zimet Rev. 1964). See
also Harry F. Shannon, 29 T.C. 702 (1958) (taxpayer would undoubtedly have been
willing to relitigate the partnership issue).
63. C.I.R. v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) ; Estate of Pierpont v. C.I.R.,
336 F.2d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 1964). But see Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45
(1934) in which the Court indicated that a statement of law by a state court of original
jurisdiction may be binding per se on the federal court.
64. Cf. Estate of Pierpont v. C.I.R., 336 F.2d at 281.
65. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 1955).
66. 302 F.2d 693, 695 (3d Cir. 1962).
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But the difficulty in avoiding the effect of a state court decree is
indicative of only one thing-that upon its entry the decree has con-
clusively fixed or established the rights and duties of the parties. Like-
wise, the same can be said for a judgment collusively obtained. If the
rendering court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties,
the rights and duties which obtain are fixed no less conclusively because
the judgment has been collusively or fraudulently obtained. Evidence of
fraud or of collusion may serve to indicate that the rights and duties are
not fixed for the reasons of fact or of law, or of both, for which they
are purported to have been fixed, but it will not alter the fact that the
rights and duties are conclusively established by the judgment or decree.
The state court decree considered in Darlington's Estate67 directed
that any federal estate tax savings resulting from the estate's deduction
of state taxes on charitable gifts, if permitted, should inure solely to the
charities.68 The decree did conclusively entitle the charities to the tax
savings if any were effected, and the other beneficiaries of the estate
would have a hard time avoiding the effect of the decree.69 Why this
fact should conclusively establish that the savings would inure as a gift
of the testator rather than by consent of the other beneficiaries, if the
source of the inurement was important,"' is not indicated in the opinion.
It would seem that if the source of the inurement was not signi-
ficant, then neither was the issue of collusiveness or adversity. If the
crux of the controversy was whether the tax saving would, without
regard to the reasons, in fact inure to the charitable recipients, the issue
of collusiveness or adversity was totally irrelevant. The charities were
conclusively entitled to the tax savings, if any, without regard to the
nature of the proceedings that culminated in the decree.
Time of Entry as the Basis for a New Approach
It may be asked, if state judgments are treated only as conclusive
evidence of rights and duties as of the time of their entry, what of
significance will be left of them? Why should federal courts not proceed
entirely oblivious to them and relitigate their subjects? Certainly the
67. id.
68. Pursuant to INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2053(d) (2).
69. Though it is difficult to imagine why they should want to avoid it, the only
persons monetarily interested were the Government and the charities. Darlington's
Estate, 36 T.C. 599, 604 (1961).
70. The presence of a state decree seems to have obscured this federal question
of vital significance. The Tax Court and the Commissioner appear to have assumed
that § 2053(d) (2) may be availed of only if its resulting savings will inure to the
charitable recipient by virtue of the will as affected by state law. The Third Circuit
may have assumed that the all important question was whether the charities would get
the benefit of any tax saving.
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moment, or for that matter the day, of their entry will be but a minute
portion of the tax period or periods under review.
The time of entry may serve as a convenient starting point, both
chronologically and analytically. If the period under review precedes or
follows entry of the judgment, and if the only issue is whether the
taxpayer's rights and duties, as evidenced by the judgment, obtained
during that period, the party introducing the judgment might be made
to enjoy a presumption that the judgment rights did obtain, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Similarly, if the inquiry is whether
the taxpayer's rights and duties obtain for the reasons for which they
are purported to obtain, the introducing party might enjoy a like
presumption.
The facts of Leslie H. Green" can be made to serve as an illustra-
tion. The taxpayer in that case had established a trust, naming himself
as trustee. The Commissioner sought to tax trust income to the settlor-
grantor on the theory that he had retained unlimited power over the
trust corpus, thereby making the trust revocable. After deficiency pro-
ceedings had been initiated, the taxpayer went into a Michigan court12
to have the trust instrument interpreted. The Michigan court decreed
that the trust was not revocable, that trust income and corpus belonged
solely to the beneficiaries, that the settlor could not borrow money from
the trust except upon adequate security and for the going interest rates,
and that he could not purchase property from or sell property to the
trust except for fair value."2
Upon entry of the Michigan court's decree, the trust became ir-
revocable."4 It was no longer subject to the objections that the Com-
missioner had raised. In a federal tax case relating to a period after its
entry, the taxpayer might be accorded a presumption that the trust
continued to be irrevocable in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
In a case relating to a period prior to entry of the decree, the taxpayer
might be accorded a presumption that the trust was irrevocable prior to
entry of the decree, but the presumption might be rebutted by evidence
that a construction of the trust instrument was not sought until after
deficiency proceedings were begun.
The time of entry may also serve as a turning point. Under the
facts of Leslie H. Green,' 5 if the tax period under inquiry included the
date of entry of the decree, the taxpayer might be determined to be taxable
71. 7 T.C. 263 (1946).
72. Circuit Court, County of Oakland, State of Michigan.
73. 7 T.C. at 269.
74. Id. at 270.
75. 7 T.C. 263 (1946).
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on trust income earned before but not after the date of entry.
The same principles might be applied in cases in which the reasons
behind the right-duty relationship are important. In the area of the
marital deduction, for example, the interest in property must pass from
the decedent to the surviving spouse in order to qualify for the deduc-
tion."' A decree reciting that the surviving spouse is entitled to given
property tells only one-half of the story. If the decree purports to make
the award on the basis of the will or laws of intestate succession, the
estate might be accorded a rebuttable presumption that the property has
passed from the decedent and is not a gift from the other beneficiaries.
The kinds of evidence sufficient to rebutt the presumption and
subject the judgment to relitigation might be of the kinds now deemed
sufficient to undermine the conclusiveness of the judgment.7 7  It is
suggested that the present "strict ' 78 standard be followed, i.e., that the
factual and legal determinations, upon which judgments obtained in
non-adversary proceedings are purported to be predicated, be subject to
relitigation.
A Rationale of the New Approach
Treating state judgments in this manner would likely lead to tax
results that are much the same as are now achieved. However, it would
permit a uniform standard of review to replace the state of confusion
that now exists concerning the determination of which judgments shall
be accorded conclusiveness."9 It would provide a basis for reconciling
the views of the Third Circuit and the other circuit courts.80 Tax-
payers, certain in the knowledge that a judgment obtained in non-
adversary proceedings would be subject to review, would be spared
unnecessary trips to the local courthouse, and the dangers presented by
the aura of judgment would be minimized.
One reason sometimes given for according conclusiveness to state
court judgments is that failure to do so would be a reflection upon the
state courts' integrity.81 One writer has stated in this regard that, "The
76. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056(a).
77. See Sachs, supra note 57; Berger, supra note 51; Colowick, supra note 57.
These articles contain discussions of the kinds of evidence that have invalidated the
conclusiveness of state court judgments.
78. See Berger, supra note 51, at 106.
79. See Berger, supra note 51, at 107-08 for a discussion of the lack of uniformity
in Tax Court decisions.
80. This can be accomplished by acknowledging the conclusiveness of rights and
duties as adjudicated but recognizing that they may not have obtained prior to judgment
and that they may not obtain for the factual or legal reasons upon which they are pur-
ported to be predicated.
81. Frank C. Rand, TAX CT. MEM. 1960-216, 29 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 60, 215
at 60-1349.
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realities of the federal-state court institutional relationships are such that
an inhibiting delicacy must be overcome by a federal court before impugn-
ing the integrity of the state court proceeding."82
It is questionable whether according state judgments conclusiveness
only as evidence of rights and duties as of the time of entry of the
judgment would impugn the integrity of the courts rendering them. If
by "proceedings" the pleadings, determinations of fact and announce-
ments of law behind a judgment are meant, then to accord the pro-
ceedings something less than conclusiveness would be to impugn their
integrity for federal tax purposes. But the integrity of the rendering
court could be considered impugned only if it is assumed that state courts
are charged with guarding the federal revenue. The courts' integrity
can be impugned only if it is assumed that they have breached or
neglected some duty.
Whether the federal treasury is a legitimate concern of the state
courts is subject to question. Surely no court should actively and con-
sciously lend its counsel and aid to a scheme to deny the Government
its just amount of tax. But, is a state court, in the face of crowded
calendars and the many other concerns with which it has been specifically
charged, bound to thwart or question, in the interest of a party not
represented, what may be legitimate, non-tax-motivated objectives of its
litigants ?"3 If it is not, then to accord its "proceedings" something less
than conclusiveness is not to impugn its integrity.
CONCLUSION
The role of state judgments in federal tax cases should be more
precisely defined. Their role should be limited to that of conclusive
evidence of rights and duties as of the time of their entry and presump-
tive evidence of the factual and legal determinations upon which they
are based.
If state judgments are viewed only as evidence, of the qualities
indicated above, the tax issue will be more carefully sought out and
analyzed before the search for evidence begins. When treated as evidence,
their relevance to the issue can better be tested. And surely, the applica-
tion of relevant evidence to the real tax issue can only lead to better and
more efficient tax administration.
82. Oliver, The Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings,
41 CALIF. L. REv. 638, 665 (1953).
83. Query, whether the Secretary of State of a state is bound to inquire, before
issuing a certificate of incorporation, if a primary purpose of the applicants in securing
it is to evade or avoid a part of the federal tax. Query, also, whether his integrity is
impugned if the corporation is subsequently denied a surtax exemption pursuant to
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1551.
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